NGOs, Civil Society and Capacity-Building
Towards the Development of Strategy
By Allan Kaplan
Community Development Resource Association
1994
| NGOs, Civil Society and Capacity-Building Towards the Development of Strategy By Allan Kaplan |
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1. THE QUESTION
One of the major constraining factors to NGO effectiveness is the lack of adequate strategy to give effect to organisational vision. The lack of a commonly held - and motivating - organisational vision is itself often problematic, demanding leadership attention or consultancy intervention. An organisation without a vision, without direction, rapidly becomes incapacitated, prey to contrary winds and internally mutinous. Yet vision alone, once articulated, is often insufficient to ensure competent practice. Vision is couched in broad terms, as a general direction, unifying purpose or common thread. Vital for organisational coherence and identity, but not sufficient to prioritize action and evaluate its impact. A specific strategy - or strategies - is required to give effect to vision, to operationalise a general direction. Any number of activities - reflective of available resources and current context - may, to a greater or lesser extent, move an organisation some way towards realizing its vision. How does the NGO choose, how does it prioritize, how does it marshall and co-ordinate its scarce resources? How does it evaluate the impact of different activities, different strategies? How does it relate different activities to each other, and to the overall vision?
One of the most common debilitating factors in NGO functioning is the inability to develop and manage strategy, to recognise the essential differences between different options, to choose between options and to relate different strategic strands to each other in such a way as to maintain organisational coherence and optimal utilization of scarce resources.
1.1 Collective Vision And Specific Strategy
This paper is an attempt to provide some initial assistance towards the task of delineating strategy for NGOs. It is written in the context of South Africa 1994, a transitional society with a dynamic and energetic NGO community. In this context, the changes in NGO visioning are clear. In the past, NGOs were required to engage in resistance to a given status quo; to react to powerful forces; to destroy the power of those forces; to break down an existing reality. The time has now come to build, and we are ill-equipped. At issue is the translation of the new vision into viable strategy.
Into the vision-vacuum which was created by the sociopolitical u-turn crept two phrases, now ubiquitous in South African development discourse. The first is "civil society"; development work is seen to be directed towards the building of a vibrant and vital civil society. The second is "capacity-building"; the way to achieve a vibrant and vital civil society is to build the capacity of the organs and instruments of civil society - we look towards the proliferation of effective peoples' organisations. (These perspectives are not limited to South Africa; they form an integral part of international development discourse). Thus our collective vision is clear: development work is building the capacity of the organs of civil society. The specific identities of many NGOs is framed and informed by this collective vision.
Yet, having this vision is a far cry from the discrete strategies required to give effect to the vision. For one thing, we lack a common perspective on what we mean by "civil society" and "capacity-building". For another, what we understand is often so vague and general as to allow us to engage in many undifferentiated activities at the same time. At the very least, in order to develop and manage our specific strategies we need to analyze the vision in a manner which facilitates our choosing of particular strategic options. Strategy is a question of directed choice; of the optimal and judicious use of scarce resources to give effect to an organisational vision. What can we understand by civil society, and what are our options for building towards it?
2. THE DEVELOPMENT OF CIVIL SOCIETY
The image of a strongly developed civil society is one in which the power of the State and of Capital is held in balance by a plethora of competent, independent and democratic community-based organisations; one in which, according to Narsoo, "there are a thousand buds of power blooming, where there is a rich texture and depth of organisation, and where debate, creativity, innovations and self-expression abound..."(1) As Narsoo notes, the concept of civil society is a contested terrain, insofar as the exact extent and limit of State intervention versus the integrity of civil society activity remains an open question. In some countries - notably those of Eastern Europe - civil society is defined relatively broadly and thus may include the State. The definition in South Africa most often refers to the non-governmental sector. Civil society has been referred to as all those voluntarily constituted social relations, organisations and institutions that stand outside of state structures. The term "organs of civil society" is often used with reference to these groups. Shirley Walters notes that, "Both the state and civil society are integrally part of the processes of governance. It is within civil society that consent for or contestation over the policy and practices of the state are cultivated".(2)
Whatever our particular definition of civil society may be, whatever our particular preference, two points remain salient. The first is that much of the debate regarding civil society centres around the relationship it should have with the state. The second is that, civil society is "a crucial element" in a democratic society". Beyond this all we have to go on is a general notion of civil society as a mushrooming of "peoples' organisations." Very little else. In all the debate, then, while our overall vision may be clear, there is very little to inform NGOs with respect to their development of specific strategy. Our development vision may refer to capacity-building with the intention of strengthening civil society, but do our current perspectives provide us with enough analysis to strategise? With whom should we work, and how? Where to place resources, how to differentiate and manage strategies, how to evaluate impact? We all more or less know what we want, and many are achieving a great deal, but the absence of differentiated strategy is palpable in many NGOs, and the lack of focus drains energies and resources. As NGOs, we need some tools of analysis to maintain the cutting edge of social transformation.
I do not have a definition of civil society which is better than, or even substantially different from, anyone else's. I do not intend to take a position in the debate concerning the state and civil society. But civil society is a complex and multi-dimensional concept, and it seems to take on different configurations depending on the angle from which it is viewed. What I am going to do is simply look at it from a fresh perspective, one which will hopefully provide a number of configurations to serve as analytical tools with which to develop strategy. Later, a perspective on "capacity-building" should provide another tool. Thereafter we will attempt to use these to revisit the question of NGO strategic development.
Civil society, in its broadest sense, seems to imply a society in which the interests, concerns, and dignity of the civilian, the citizen, the "ordinary person", are taken seriously. That is to say, a society which takes as its point of departure the rights (and responsibilities) of the individual "person in the street", rather than ideologies (of whatever kind) or the self-interest of particular groupings. The first question that confronts us then, is: what are the social institutions which are necessary for a well-functioning civil society. The second is, how should these institutions be constituted to ensure that they serve the interests of the individual citizen, rather than the interests of institutional hierarchies, particular ideologies or the self-interest of particular groupings.
2.2 AN INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS OF CIVIL SOCIETY
Fowler notes that, "Institutions are stable patterns of behaviour that are recognized and valued by society". Uphoff maintains that institutions "...are complexes of norms and behaviours that persist over time by serving collectively valued purposes. Institutions can be concrete, like a nation's central bank or quite diffuse and general such as the institution of money". For our purposes we use the term social institution here in the sense of "quite diffuse and general" mentioned above.
The first institution that comes to mind is, strangely, the institution of government. The state may or may not form a part of civil society, depending on our particular characterisation, but it is certainly necessary to a well-functioning civil society. Some form of authoritative regulation of social affairs is, perhaps unfortunately, necessary if we are to talk of civil society as opposed to anarchy. Quite how this institution should be constituted, how much weight it should have, how interventionist it should be, is not our immediate concern. Let us simply say for now that sound government is a primary social institution, and leave the issue of what is meant by "sound" to be addressed slightly further on in the text.
Law, the judicial system, is another social institution of paramount importance. A civil society is impossible to conceive of without a "soundly-constituted" institution of law. Education is another such institution. Without the institution of education, civil society remains a fantasy.
The institution of education becomes interesting when we recognise that it can be sub-divided into sections like "pre-primary education", "primary", "secondary", "technical", "tertiary" and "continuing/adult". Each of these can then be seen as institutions in their own right. What are the consequences for a society which recognizes the importance of the institution of education but which does not provide resources towards the development of pre-primary education as an institution; that is, which does not recognise the role of pre-primary education in the development of a society which is attempting to be "civil" (as in South Africa)? Is the institution of primary education more important to a developing country with inadequate resources than the institution of secondary education? Is the institution of tertiary education more important than that of technical education, or vice versa, or neither?
Other institutions which come immediately to mind are those of health, shelter, culture, agriculture, money, capital, work, labour, religion,information, environment, and even community and family. Obviously, there are many more; equally apparent, all of these can be sub-divided to some extent. Some overlap with others, some can be delineated in different ways. The point here is not to provide a definitive and exhaustive list, but simply to use these examples to indicate the usefulness of an institutional analysis of civil society.
In a developing society with limited resources - such as South Africa - where should we be putting our energies? Which institutions need strengthening, adjustment, reform, revolution? Which are of primary importance, which secondary? Which depend on others for their own adequate functioning? Which have been particularly debilitated through oppression and partisan political activity; which have been particularly neglected? Upon which does an emerging civil society primarily depend? Different persons and organisations will respond differently to these questions. It is not the particular response which is relevant to our purposes here, but rather the questions themselves. This kind of institutional analysis forms our first level of strategic decision making. If our NGO works "cross-sectorally" - perhaps in training, organisation development, funding, general community development - then there are choices to be made in response to our analysis. If our NGO already works within an institutional sector, we need to be able to analyze this sector adequately, to establish its relationships and dependencies on other institutions, in order to begin to work strategically.
To provide one personal example: my own NGO provides organisation development consultancy services to "organisations working for social transformation", in the interests of strengthening civil society. Given the South Africa of the past, we have never worked with state institutions, only with other NGOs. Now South Africa is changing; what should our relationship with the future state be? I have little doubt that it will need organisational assistance, but what should our response be to the requests which are already beginning to emerge? Should we leave the state to others, and concentrate on non-governmental social institutions on the assumption that a powerful civil society will be the best guarantee of competent and acceptable state performance? Or should we work with the state on the assumption that the development of other vital social institutions will be compromised by incompetent or unacceptable state practice? In other words, what is our particular analysis of our particular society at a given point in time, which will inform our strategic decision-making with respect to our limited resources?
To mention another example: should an educational NGO, having developed proven methodologies for teacher improvement, move from concentrating on secondary school teachers to putting its scarce resources into pre-primary teacher training because a large donor has "made it an offer it cannot refuse"? What is its own analysis of the relative importance of the two social institutions? Without our own ability to analyze and strategise, we as NGOs are at the mercy of a generalised vision and overwhelming external forces.
2.3 TOWARDS CIVIL INSTITUTIONS
So an institutional "diagnosis" of society provides us with our first level of strategic analysis. But there is a further, more crucial level of analysis which we need to engage in. Institutions in themselves are vital components of society; where they are lacking, or under-resourced, problems arise. However, institutions of themselves do not necessarily ensure the emergence of a civil society. We need to go back to the question, raised in the previous section, of what characterizes a "sound" institution, in terms of contributing to civil society. In other words, how should these institutions be constituted to ensure that they serve the interests of the individual citizen, rather than the interests of institutional hierarchies, particular ideologies or the self-interest of particular groupings.
I would contend that the way to characterize civil society is as a society in which more people have access to resources and power over choices. Bearing in mind that a civil society, in its broadest sense, is a society in which the interests, concerns, rights and dignity of the civilian, the citizen, the "ordinary person", are taken seriously. If this is an appropriate perspective, then it makes sense to judge the "soundness" of a civil institution in terms of whether "more people have access to resources and power over choices".
Let's look at this characterisation in slightly more depth. First, it contains the adjective "more" as a recognition that perfection is a fantasy; a civil society is one which is "in process", rather than one in which struggle has ceased. Second, it demands not only that a social institution have adequate resources assigned to it, but further that ordinary individual citizens have access to those resources. Third, it argues that individual citizens are able to influence - not simply theoretically but in reality - those aspects of the particular institution which impinge on their lives. Consequently, if this characterisation were to hold for the institutions of society, we would have a society which genuinely took as its point of departure the rights and concerns of its citizens, rather than those of "institutional hierarchies, particular ideologies or the self interest of particular groupings". A civil society.
We can thus begin to analyse social institutions not simply in relation to each other, but in the way they are internally constituted. To take the institution of law as an example. The making of laws belongs to the institution of government; the first question to be asked, then, concerns this latter institution - to what extent is the individual able to influence it? But once the law is made, questions refer to the institution of law. Do all people have equal access to it, or does access depend on financial resources? Are practitioners impartial, or do they respond more favourably to suits-and-ties than to rags-and-bones? Do the institutional hierarchies use language which the ordinary citizen can understand, or do they maintain their power - and consequently reduce the user's ability to choose, or influence - by using jargon only understandable by the institutional elite? Do rural people have the same access as urban? Can female practitioners advance at the same rate as males; do they really enjoy the same rights? Is access to the law equally available to squatters and home-owners; is access easier for people of a particular skin colour, or religious or ideological persuasion?
Similar or comparable questions can be asked of each and every social institution. Think only of the institution with which you are most involved, or take institutions which most impinge on your life, like health, or shelter, or education, or work. These kinds of questions provide us with our second layer of analysis into social institutions in terms of whether they contribute to civil society or not. Now we are concerned not simply with the amount to which institutions are resourced, or with their relations one to another, but with how they are internally constituted. It is this layer of analysis with which we must engage if we are to be able to strategise intelligently. We are NGOs trying to strengthen civil society; how, and with what, do we need to engage?
3. STRATEGIES TOWARDS THE DEVELOPMENT OF CIVIL SOCIETY
One area of possibility is to provide. The particular institution - with which we as an individual NGO are involved - being under-resourced, or lacking in effective delivery, or the people having only limited or partial access to it, we feel called upon to supplement. There are many ways in which we can do this: by providing access to marginalized users, by providing resources, by providing services. All of these are legitimate activities and strategies, yet they raise questions. Can we, as a small NGO, really make a difference to the institution itself, thus contributing to civil society, or are we simply alleviating the pain of the actual configuration of society for a small number of recipients only? Is it possible that this serves to maintain the status quo by relieving institutional hierarchies of responsibility, or by reducing the urgency of peoples' demands for redress, for a change in the institutional configuration? Does it increase complacency and the expectation of outside assistance, thereby reducing peoples' power and their capacity to influence, to demand and exercise some control? Yet in situations of deprivation, do we have the right to deny people the resources and services which we are able to provide and which people have the right to expect of a civil institution?
Our point of entry will depend on our analysis of the institution and of our own capacity to respond. Perhaps the provision of resources or services alone is the appropriate response. Perhaps we want to do other. Who are the other NGOs operating within the same institution? Could we link up, collaborate, pool resources in a way which might provide a more consolidated and exhaustive service?
Perhaps we could begin to lobby the institutional hierarchies, try to work on the level of policy so that the access of ordinary people to the institution is increased, so that people gain more control, more influence, over the form and utilization of its resources. If this is what we intend, can we do it as a relatively small and marginal NGO, or should we look at ways of increasing our "weight", perhaps by joining with others, forming a national or regional body, and so on. Whatever we choose has implications for strategy. We - as the NGO - would need to incorporate the capacity for research, for writing, for analysis and policy formation, for collaboration and influencing. Will we have to reduce our capacity for service in order to accomplish this? Either way, we will need to be careful that our strategies actually contribute to a more civil institution, rather than merely drain our energies as we engage with the institution on behalf of the people. Are more people actually gaining access to resources and power over choices?
3.3 ORGANISATIONAL CAPACITY-BUILDING
The options for us as NGOs mentioned above fall into two strategic strands: provision of resources and services and influence over policy. While both can serve to render an institution more "sound", we should remember that a civil institution takes as its point of departure the rights of the ordinary citizen, the right of access and the right of choice. Civil society is a society whose institutions belong to the people. Ordinary people need to gain mastery over these institutions, need to wrest control from the hands of elites, particular groupings or hierarchies, need to integrate the institutions into their daily lives, need to ensure that they are served by these institutions, rather than only serve them. Therefore it is not simply the institutions which need to change; people themselves need to gain the capacity to "own" them, to ensure that the values they perpetuate are those commensurate with a civil society, with the rights of all individuals to access and control.
This process cannot be facilitated by NGOs purely through provision or influence. The capacities of the citizens themselves need to be developed. This is not to say that people have no capacities, but rather that institutions gain a life of their own which often distances them from their users. Capacity, or mastery, can be gained through provision of information, through training, but only partially. Institutions are powerful entities, and people will ultimately gain access to, and control over, them through organisation. People need to gain the capacity for organisation, need to become organized, in order to ensure integration of the institution into their lives. This is where the concept of civil society as "a plethora of competent, independent and democratic community-based organisations" comes in, where "...there are a thousand buds of power blooming, where there is a rich texture and depth of organisation...". Community-based organisations need to arise, to grow and expand their capacity to make a particular institution their own, to ensure that they have the organized power to demand access and exert influence.
This then forms another possibility for NGO strategy; what has come to be known as "capacity-building", the facilitation and support of viable community-based organisations. Seen in this light, it is no longer a vague and general social vision, but a strategic response to a particular analysis of a specific institution in a particular society at a specific point in time, as well as an understanding of our NGO's positioning within that institutional sector.
For too long we have seen civil society simply as a vague, undifferentiated concept conceived as an opposition, counterforce or balance to the state. A proliferation of peoples' organisations and peoples' power to hold the state in check (even where the state is conceived as part of civil society). And it is this, but it is also more. Civil society is the control of the individual citizen over the institutions of society; their access to those institutions, their influence over them, and the extent to which they reflect the chosen values of a society. In all of this, of course the institution of government plays a key and primary role; it pervades all other institutions, can distort or manipulate them, or play a part in their reform. Civil society will not flourish where the power of the state is too excessive, intrusive, or partisan; the institution of government is therefore a major site of struggle. But it is not by any means the only one; many institutions are in need of transformation, and such transformation will go a long way towards containing the power of the state. Where the various institutions are owned and influenced by ordinary people, a civil society can be said to be emerging.
4. THE INSTITUTION OF ORGANISATION ITSELF
An institutional analysis, then, provides NGOs with a handle on the development of strategy. NGOs, even where they are seen as relevant players in development, are often seen as marginal or "bit" players, able to do innovative or experimental work, able to supplement the provision of scarce resources by the state or by institutional agencies, able to respond flexibly to communities "on the ground". These are important and vital characteristics, not to be sacrificed, but we tend to trap ourselves into being typecast as ultimately not very effectual - in terms of the transformation of society - when we do not analyze and strategise adequately. Where and how should we engage in order to impact on a particular institution, and to what extent need we engage with other institutions in order to assist with the transformation of the one with which we are concerned. (In this regard, it is clear that all institutions are affected by the institution of government, but they are also affected by other institutions; there is a continuous interweaving across permeable boundaries).
We have already noted that the degree of transformation of an institution can be gauged by the extent to which ordinary people have access to it and are able to influence it. We have also noted that this, in turn, depends on the capacity of people to organise, on the degree of organisation attained by people on the ground, with respect to a particular institution. Put another way, the proliferation of community-based organisations impacting on a specific institution will contribute towards ownership of that institution by communities, and its integration into the lives of ordinary people. The extent to which community-based organisations exist, to that extent will the power of an institution devolve to the people, and thus will the manner in which an institution is constituted be transformed. Therefore, as has already been noted, one strategy with which NGOs can engage is the facilitation of community-based organisations; building peoples' capacity to understand a particular institution and to organise within it. But this raises another point.
If organisation is such a vital component of civil society, if the ability of people to organise themselves is seen as important, if the proliferation of peoples' organisations is seen as an integral part of people-centred development, then the discipline of organisation development forms an important potential strand of NGO development work. But more than this, it becomes vital that organisation as such be seen as an institution in its own right, one which is necessary to a civil society.
In this sense organisation is not simply a strategy or a discipline but a social institution taking its place alongside the institutions of government, law, education, health, and so on. It is, in fact, one of the primary institutions of civil society. As with government, it penetrates every other institution. But in contrast to our attempts to mitigate the pervasive influence of government in our quest for a civil society, we need to intensify the role of organisation as an institution in our striving for the same end. It demands resource provision, and it needs to become accessible to ordinary people. It needs to function for people, to assist them to increase their ability to make their own choices concerning the issues which affect them. Civil society is inconceivable without it.
Yet at present, at least in South Africa, it is one of the most under-resourced and least accessible of any institution, even while no institution can function adequately without it. It is necessary not merely for the development of community-based organisations, but also for NGOs themselves, and for agencies operating in all other institutions, including government.
5. FOCUS ON CAPACITY-BUILDING AS A STRATEGIC OPTION
The above discussion should serve to provide us, as NGOs, with a number of different analytical tools with which to develop focused strategy out of general vision. At the very least, it will hopefully provoke much needed debate within NGOs. But a further level of analysis is required in order to make organisational sense out of strategic options. This level has to do with a deeper understanding of the strategies themselves.
Current development discourse refers ubiquitously, and too glibly, to the concept of capacity-building. Indeed, capacity-building is often equated with development. While this is perhaps partially correct, and represents an important advance in development thinking, it is often used as rhetoric without enough penetration to lift jargon into the realm of genuine discussion; lip-service masquerading as strategy. A number of options are available to us as NGOs, and they need to be explored in more depth.
Essentially, provision, as one strategic option (of resources, services, alternative methodologies), implies filling, or supplementing a lack. It raises some of the problems referred to when discussing it in the previous section - even where it is done in collaboration, or partnership, with communities, rather than as top-down largesse to recipients. But, although it may be associated with questions, it forms a vital part of our credibility as NGOs. We have no right to attempt institutional transformation if we have not engaged with that institution as alternative practitioners, and demonstrated our expertise. Can we assist communities to take over health care structures when we have no experience of, or expertise in, health? Can we assist communities to exert some influence over infrastructural urban development - say, within the institution of shelter - when we have not engaged with this institution ourselves, and gained some familiarity with alternative practices and possibilities? There are many different ways of "providing" - some of which may be pure welfare while others may be more collaborative and "developmental". But some form of provision - current or historical - by our NGO is necessary if we are to have the expertise, right or credibility to engage in other strategies. We cannot engage in institutional transformation when we have nothing alternative to offer either the institution or the communities who are seeking to impact on it.
Another strategic option is lobbying, or influencing, attempting to influence institutional policy. Lobbying requires, as has also been noted in the previous section, new capacities on the part of the NGO. Essentially, it is an attempt to engage in institutional transformation such that the institution is freed to encourage alternative practice, as well as greater individual access and influence. As such, it is an attempt to create an enabling environment for the growth of capacity. Certain forms of provision, such as training, also provide an enabling framework for the development of capacity. But neither strategy, in and of itself, can be regarded as focused capacity-building. Capacity-building requires something more.
5.1 AN ILLUSTRATIVE CASE-STUDY IN STRATEGIC OPTIONS
Let us approach the strategy of capacity-building by way of example. We take it from the institution of law - raised as an institutional instance in the previous section - as it has been approached by a number of NGOs in South Africa over the last ten years. In this example we will, for the sake of simplicity, refer to one NGO; in reality this is a composite example drawn from the experience of a number of different NGOs.
Under apartheid, the institution of law in South Africa has been used as a tool of oppression. Laws differentiated between people on the basis of skin colour, thus effectively marginalising the majority of citizens. In addition, the institution of money has been closely allied to the institutions of law and government, effectively ensuring that those already marginalised by the law had little access to the institution of law even in instances where it could work on their behalf. Finally, although the institution of law was partially peopled by persons who maintained an admirable resistance to the status quo, nevertheless the institutions of law, money and government effectively collaborated to ensure that legal practitioners stemmed predominantly from that skin colour group in society whose rights were protected and promoted by the status quo; the white minority.
Enter a legal NGO, which is rapidly to attain national status. We shall call the NGO "RIGHTS". At first, RIGHTS is set up to provide legal assistance to those people and communities who are unable to pay for legal representation. But as an NGO, given the status quo prevailing in the institutions of government and law, RIGHTS soon realized that it could carry on providing legal representation to those unable to afford it forever and still have no effect on the legal dispensation confronting the majority of citizens.
RIGHTS thus embarked on a number of different strategies. One was to concentrate on legal representation mainly for those cases which were of "public interest"; that is, those cases which, if won, would have a liberating effect on the laws themselves, and which could draw public attention to the oppressive nature of the state, thus effecting both the institutions of law and government (a sophisticated form of lobbying). Another was to promote the activities of research and publication amongst its staff, to the same end. Yet another was to undertake training programmes which would allow legal students of the "incorrect" skin colour (i.e. black) to gain access to the institution of law (provision with the intention of impacting on the institution itself). And there were others, the most relevant for our purposes here being the promotion and support of advice offices.
Advice offices functioned as community-based organisations, staffed by para-legals trained by RIGHTS. Spread throughout the country, in rural as well as urban communities, these advice offices provided the disenfranchised citizen with greater access to the institution of law, as well as the beginning of expertise, influence, and power over choices. This strategy was accomplished by RIGHTS in collaboration with other NGOs, not all of whom were legal. It was a strategy which encouraged the spread of community-based organisations, not all of which, once again, were confined to the institution of law. It was the part of RIGHTS' strategy which came closest to capacity-building. Close, but not close enough.
As the political changes began to sweep South Africa from 1990 onwards, the constraints under which RIGHTS had been operating began to fall away, more space was opened up, and more opportunities presented themselves. No longer having to concentrate so much on opposition and defiance, RIGHTS toyed with new strategies. One was to use the media to educate the ordinary citizens about their rights and about the functioning of the institution of law. This would promote access, encourage debate and influence, and generally create a more enabling environment for capacity-building and the transformation of law as an institution. Another was to engage as "consultants" to whole communities which were themselves no longer fighting government but which were winning their rights to land and embarking on infrastructural development. Thus a form of capacity-building. But the beginning of this work coincided with a gradual dissipation of the advice office network. Both these strategies called into question RIGHTS' strategy of capacity-building. (It should be said that RIGHTS itself never referred to any of its strategies as "capacity-building").
Advice offices were battling to survive because, with the changing political scenario, they were no longer in the forefront of the agendas of either the communities themselves or of the various local NGOs and donor NGOs which had been supporting them. Given this new reality they became more dependent on their own capacity, and because they had never really had adequate access to the institution of organisation, they were struggling to maintain organisational viability. And the para-legals who provided the legal advice had been narrowly trained in a limited section of law; they had not had their broader capacities developed, either to provide them with sufficient flexibility to adapt to changing circumstances or to handle organisational realities. As well, the strategy of engaging as consultants to whole communities embarking on their own development process was taking up far more of staff members' time than had been anticipated, because these legal practitioners were called upon to respond to many and diverse extra-legal requests. It became apparent, once again, that communities' capacity to organise comprises a far more complex and multi-dimensional set of competencies than the simple provision of advice, and training in a specific skill, can facilitate. At the very least the proliferation of community-based organisation requires access to the institution of organisation. While RIGHTS could provide legal training, support and advice, it had not incorporated either the discipline of organisation development or the concept of individual development (as capacity-building) sufficiently into its practice to enable it to engage in capacity-building as a viable strategic option.
It should be said once more that the above example does not reflect on any one legal NGO in South Africa. It needs further to be noted that similar examples can be found in many different sectors and in the practice of many different NGOs. Pre-primary NGOs which aim to assist in the proliferation of community-based pre-schools by providing specific skills training in education and finance run into similar problems in terms of the viability of the pre-schools as sustainable organisations. NGOs promoting co-operatives experience the same difficulties. Educational NGOs providing inservice training to teachers find the results of their work compromised by the school as an incapacitated organisation. Urban development NGOs - operating within the institutions of land and shelter - find it easier to provide specific advice and assistance with negotiations than to facilitate the growth of sustainable organisation. Agricultural NGOs provide sought after expertise, but struggle to assist farmers to attain the capacity to be flexible and innovative in the face of changing circumstances or new environmental conditions.
None of these examples is surprising. Capacity-building, as a strategic option, requires more than the specific expertise inherent in institutionally-specific NGOs. It requires access to the understanding of individual development and to the practice of organisation development. (It requires familiarity with the institution of organisation.
5.2 CAPACITY-BUILDING AS FOCUSED DEVELOPMENT WORK
Capacity-building as a strategic option for strengthening the organs and instruments of civil society is the most taxing, daunting and long-term approach that NGOs can choose. Primarily because it does not consist of the delivery of specific products, but consists rather of engagement with prolonged processes of change and resistance to change. And expertise in organisational and individual processes of change and development are lacking.
The provision of training and advice to build organisational capacity, and the liberation of institutional policy to create an enabling environment for organisational growth, are both necessary, but insufficient to the focused strategy of capacity-building. Organisations are complex, open systems, and skilled personal are only one element in the system. Further, skills training of these individuals is only one facet of individual development.
To consider the matter of individual development first: building the capacity of individuals is a far more daunting process than providing them with a skill. Of course acquiring skills is necessary, but to assume that this is all that capacity-building entails is to take a very narrow, mechanistic and thin view of the human being. Being provided with the skill does not necessarily imply the capacity to use it. For instance, one might provide training in listening skills, really "getting under the skin" of the other person. However, if the trainee has unresolved inner issues, unconscious avoidances or preconceived notions, he or she will continue to project these and continue "hearing" what they want to hear. Similarly, training evaluation skills will not ensure adequate reflection on action if the trainee has a strong resistance to change. Training the skill of chairing meetings will not stop the trainee from manipulating the meeting if they have a hidden agenda, or allowing the meeting to be manipulated if he or she is insecure or fearful.
This is why we talk of "developing" capacity rather than "training" capacity. Building capacity involves the whole person and is a long-term process, not attainable through short training courses. It demands follow up and assistance with reflection on action. Development is as much a process of "letting go" of mindsets, fixed attitudes, ingrained habits as it is a process of "taking on the new". Indeed, "letting go" is a prerequisite for change. Developing capacity has more to do with confidence, maturity, flexibility, fluidity, creativity, coherence and integrity than with specific skill acquisition. The bottom line in the development of capacity appears to be inner resourcefulness; the ability to meet the future with creativity and flexibility rather than with a fixed (trained ?) response appropriate in past situations. Individual capacity is the capacity to act competently in the face of ambiguity, uncertainty, contradiction and change. The ability to handle "fluid reality", to analyse, synthesise and respond appropriately.
The development of capacity implies the emergence of objectivity and of the ability to take criticism in an undefensive manner and to learn from it. It implies being strong enough to be vulnerable, and resourceful enough to acquire or recruit the skills needed in a given situation. Such capacity cannot be trained on short-term training courses. It is developed through guided interaction, preferably within one's own work arena. One needs to bounce against one's own context and reflect on the interface.
At the very least then, training for individual capacity-building requires that we pay attention to individual development in our training courses, not simply to the transfer of a specific set of limited skills. It requires that we facilitate in people the understanding, attitudes and skills required to encourage them to continue their process of development once the course is over. It requires that we pay much more attention than we have to the motivation for, and processes of, learning itself. And it demands that a process of follow-through with participants be built into the structure of the course, for the course itself can only be an opener, an introduction. Real learning takes place back in the home context of the organisational or community situation itself.
To do slightly more, we need to engage with people inside their working or community context, so that learning is contextualised and the principle of guided interaction is able to be adequately operationalised. Optimally the process of guided interaction should be incorporated into organisational life itself. But this implies competent organisation, and takes us from the issue of individual capacity-building to organisation development.
5.2.2 Organisation Development
For, as we have noted, individual development is only one element in the complex organisational reality of an open, developing system impacting on, and being impacted by, a constantly changing environment. Organisations struggle with questions of leadership, motivation, direction, strategy, monitoring and discipline, structure and organisational design, systems and procedures, conflict and teamwork, and many more. They often lack overview, self-awareness, and the self-reflective techniques and practices needed to achieve this. They require the techniques, ability and will to adequately analyse their context and to adapt their practices accordingly. Lack of will, resistance to change, unhealthy organisational culture and attitudes which are not responsive to the demands of change all contribute to organisational malaise, to a lack of capacity. Few of these issues will respond to an individual being sent on a training course.
Fowler notes that: "The systems view makes clear, for example, that training and human resource development cannot simply be equated with institutional or organisational development. Training can only tackle a limited number of systems in only one sort of way - through the knowledge and skills of individuals and groups. The skill of organisation development specialists lies in helping organisations correctly identify what combination of system, structure, style or environmental factor is limiting performance and selecting the right mix of tools, methods and strategies to bring about the required changes".(3) And, further, the organisation development practitioner will assist the organisation to learn from these experiences so that it may become more self-regulating in future.
Building organisational capacity then, requires practitioners skilled in the discipline of organisation. NGOs wishing to engage in building the capacity of community-based organisations as organs of civil society need to gain access to the institution of organisation and integrate it into their own practice. This can be done either in addition to their current skills or by collaborating with other NGOs.
Either way, we should be wary of being too nonchalant when we claim the strategic option of capacity-building. Ultimately, where the strategies of provision and influencing - developmentally practised rather than delivered as "welfare" - will contribute towards capacity-building, focused capacity-building itself is probably the most directly developmental approach. Not many NGOs have incorporated it as a nucleus of chosen strategy, with all its attendant ramifications; fewer have had much success.
The field is new, resources are limited, the track record which exists is not promising. Nevertheless, it is the strategy of the future if we are going to become genuinely developmental NGOs aiming to transform the institutions of civil society and build the capacity of the organs of that society.
6. THE DEVELOPMENT OF STRATEGY
We should in no way denigrate NGO strategies other than focused capacity-building. In the first instance, not all NGOs lay claim to being primarily developmental, and there is ample space for a wide variety of NGOs operating in the social sphere. Second, it may well be that in certain instances the internal constitution of particular institutions needs to be shifted, or resources need to be provided, before the strategy of capacity-building can take effect. A grossly disabling institutional environment will confound attempts to build capacity. And again, where people have had little or no access to, for example, the institutions of education and work, or family, the task of capacity-building will be that much harder.
The point of this paper is to provide some perspective on the terrain of civil society and to explore possible strategic options, not to elevate one option above others. For the problem with many NGOs does not necessarily lie in their choice of a particular option, but in their taking action without choosing a specific option, or in their failure to differentiate between options. Action, the need (to be seen) to be doing, often takes precedence over strategic analysis, the end result being something akin to Shakespeare's "much ado about nothing". Or, to turn a proverb around, there isn't necessarily fire simply because our eyes are smarting from the smoke. Too few NGOs differentiate between doing and achieving. And the only thing more debilitating than organisational activity without forethought or assessment is many such activities performed at the same time, all demanding equal attention and resources. In the resultant confusion we often find - too late - that we've tied our shoelaces together in preparation for the hundred metre sprint.
Is this too harsh a critique? It is not that we are lazy, or thoughtless, but rather that we are breaking new ground, and there is little that we have to go on. Rather like cutting our way through the undergrowth of an ancient and unpenetrated forest; with sweat obscuring our vision, and nightfall swiftly approaching, we hack with increasing desperation at the next vine, the next creeper, to discover that the next step is consuming all our concentration and that we are thoroughly lost in terms of overall direction. We should not underestimate the extent to which we diminish our own capacity through lack of strategic clarity; neither should we underestimate the organisational tensions caused by pursuing different strategies simultaneously without differentiating adequately between them.
6.1 UNDEVELOPED STRATEGY EXPLORED THROUGH THE MEDIUM OF CASE-STUDIES
The following examples should serve to highlight the most pertinent and relevant of these tensions and emphasize the crippling nature of incoherent strategy. To begin with the general problem of lack of clarity, we will consider the case of an NGO operating in a highly under-resourced region. We will call the NGO TRUST. (All examples considered in this section refer to the actual histories of real NGOs. Real names are withheld for the sake of confidentiality only).
6.1.1 Issue One: Lack of Coherent Strategy
TRUST was set up as a "general" development NGO operating in a very large, particularly under-resourced region. It had no specific institutional or sectoral bias; its "mandate" was simply development as such. The region was under-resourced in many ways, not least in the sense of NGO and CBO activity; there were few NGOs and those which existed were embryonic, while CBO activity was almost non-existent.
In order to begin work, TRUST conducted a series of workshops with communities as a means of ascertaining community needs. Inevitably these needs extended in every direction, into every institutional sector. TRUST felt obliged to respond to them all, thus expanding rapidly as an organisation and engaging in many different activities simultaneously.
Five years down the line, TRUST was a shambles, requiring the assistance of organisation consultants. An initial survey of the organisation revealed a disastrous combination of factors resulting in utter chaos. Many unskilled staff, incoherent structures and systems, no effective leadership or management, no accountability or motivation, no communication. Virtually every staff member referred to the organisation as "they" or "it", and saw themselves as "outside". The NGO had had almost no impact on the ground whatsoever; the few programmes which had begun promisingly had all disintegrated.
The situation could be attributed to a number of factors, but by far the major cause of debilitation was lack of strategy. While a general "developmental" vision was commonly held, activities were performed without differentiation, without any sense of strategy. Rather than directing itself to experimenting, improving and developing a particular methodology or strategic intervention, TRUST tried to respond to every need in the region. It worked with NGOs, CBOs, whole communities and community enterprises. It attempted to facilitate organisation development, engaged in many different training activities - both without follow-through - and coordinated training opportunities. It involved itself with extensive networking activities (amongst NGOs), as well as with extensive lobbying and advocacy work (directed towards the institutions of government, law, health education, and others). It did research into gender and attempted to provide specialist input in the fields of agriculture, education, employment creation and health. It was heavily involved with "donor education". It was attempting to create an enabling environment for development, to provide specialist services to aid the development process, to facilitate "capacity-building" itself, and to obtain funding for members of its constituency.
Many of these activities were unrelated to each other, at least so far as staff understood them. No priorities were given to particular activities, no strategic choices were made which staff could articulate and relate to. There was no long-term planning, few considered goals set. There were no structures to facilitate the integration of various staff and various functions within particular strategies. Staff worked in relative isolation, doing their own thing, mostly unaware of what others were doing. All because there was no coherent strategy or strategic thinking.
Although this may read like fiction, it remains unexaggerated fact. And although it is admittedly an extreme example, it is not unique, nor rare. Most NGOs are debilitated in similar ways, to some extent at least.
6.1.2 Issue Two: The Tension Between Responsiveness and Proactivity
The extremity of the example serves to throw the general problem into relief, but it also illustrates a more specific tension with respect to strategy formulation.
One of the major advantages of NGOs is their ability to respond to community needs, to "work from the bottom up", to start from where the people are. To work flexibly and responsively in terms of community wishes, and thus to remain accountable to people "on the ground". This is often contrasted with agencies and institutions which work "top down", imposing their interpretation of what is needed on the very people for whom they claim to be working. And it is true that in the development process the integrity of the community or client should at all times remain sacrosanct, and that a "top down" approach often reveals a patronising and presumptuous attitude which disempowers rather than empowers, and thus reduces capacity rather than enhancing it. At the same time, however, the integrity and coherence of the NGO itself is vital if the NGO is maintain effectiveness. And this in turn means that an NGO needs to be proactive and directed in its endeavours. Indeed, the development of strategy implies proactivity in place of reaction. Thus we expect an NGO to be both responsive as well as proactive, to interpret needs as well as to respect the wisdom of the client. If we did not expect this of an NGO then the NGO would have no "added value", and would be unnecessary. The tension that results from these opposing claims on NGO functioning is not one that can be wished away, or avoided. It needs to be taken on board and worked with in a continual effort to maintain a sense of balance, to ensure that we do not slip into one or other of the polarities. NGO strategy formulation is a complex and creative balancing act, and demands due attention at all times.
6.1.3 Issue Three: The Tension Between Advocacy and Capacity-Building
Another tension caused by the polarities inherent in strategic management has to do with the fact that two strategic options often stand in seeming organisational contradiction to each other. These are the options of capacity-building and influencing.
An NGO which we will call TEAM, operating within the institution of work, is attempting to facilitate the development of viable co-operative enterprises amongst the rural unemployed. TEAM engages in a strategy of focused capacity-building. Its fieldworkers function as organisational consultants to the various co-operatives, and in addition TEAM provides back-up training and specialist advice. As its strategy takes effect the co-operative organisations grow in strength and organisational ability, but TEAM notices that in spite of this the co-operatives remain marginalized, outside the main stream of business. Their organisational competence appears to bear little relation to their inability to make a profit.
Gradually it dawns on TEAM that the co-operatives lack of success is a function of the fact that they remain outside of the mainstream of business. Being from the marginalized sector of the population, they have little access to business networks, where who you know pays greater dividends than what you can do. Co-operatives do not have an impressive track record, with the result that they are effectively excluded from markets (even where they have a marketable product), from sources of finance (even where they have viable business plans), and from reliable supplies (particularly where they need to buy on credit). And co-operatives have no way of challenging the status quo, for they operate as individual small businesses without collective clout.
TEAM thus decides to embark on new strategies in addition to capacity-building; the aim now is to directly influence policy makers in the institutions of work and money. Various strategies are used, including collaboration between co-operatives and approaches to corporations, banking institutions and the state. New and innovative approaches are made to donors. Research, writing and publications are used to influence and thus affect changes in the climate of the relevant institutions towards co-operatives.
After a while TEAM discovers that many of its best fieldworkers are now engaged almost exclusively in these strategies, to the detriment of their work in the field. The co-operatives are no longer getting the organisational support which they once were, and because capacity had not yet been sufficiently built they are sliding downhill fast. The institutional dispensations are gradually shifting to allow greater access, but the co-operatives are no longer in a position to make use of this.
It is difficult for TEAM to adapt its strategy to the emerging consequences of their actions for two important reasons. First, as their strategy of influencing is actually having an effect, it is genuinely difficult to relinquish this for focused capacity-building, which is recognised as a much longer-term strategy (and while it is obvious that both strategies are necessary simultaneously, TEAM simply does not have the resources). The second reason is less "genuine". It has been noted that the "best fieldworkers" were given the task of influencing. These fieldworkers now find it extremely difficult to "go back" to the task of working directly with the rural co-operatives. This latter job now feels devoid of status and glamour, devoid of excitement and power and the heady feeling of moving amongst, and dealing on equal terms with, the formulators of institutional policy, the power brokers themselves. What makes TEAM's dilemma all the more painful is that the staff members in question cannot admit this reality, even to themselves.
This strategic tension between influencing and capacity-building is prevalent in a wide range of NGOs. I have seen it operating in the fields of health, education, law, shelter, and labour, to name but a few. In almost every case the two issues mentioned above are superimposed on each other. On the one hand there is a genuine contradiction between the two strategies in terms of time, energy, resources and kind of activity, while they are often simultaneously necessary. On the other hand, NGO staff get seduced by high profile work and resent the long-term "grind" of focused development work which carries too little social recognition with it. Those staff engaging in the so-called "high profile" work generally gravitate towards leadership positions in the NGO, with resultant negative consequences for the strategy of focused development work or capacity-building. Taken to an extreme, I have sometimes come across NGO leadership which uses their organisation's work "on the ground" as a coin of exchange for personal power or strategic institutional influence while being unaware of, or ignoring the fact, that their NGO's actual impact on the ground is minimal. A fact which plays havoc with staff motivation and accountability.
6.1.4 Issue Four: The Phenomenon of "Add-on" Projects
A final source of tension arising out of incoherent strategy will be touched on only briefly, although it severely compromises organisational integrity. It is the "adding on" of projects which have only a peripheral relationship to an organisation's strategy because it is "suggested" by donors, and is seen as a means of raising funds or maintaining donor credibility. NGOs which are confused or unclear about their own strategy, or which are insecure about the choices they are making, are particularly prey to this form of corruption.
It comes in the form of a temptation, and entails taking on board a new area of work, or a project package, because the NGO works in that field or in a peripheral one. The donor thinks it is important (and perhaps it is), the field is obviously in need of it, and there is no-one else so well placed or experienced or skilled as to be able to take it on. (NGOs are not only susceptible to corruption through confusion or insecurity; if they are not wary it is the price they pay for success). The consequence for an NGO may simply lie in an overburdening; the money may be welcome but it does not easily purchase more skills, or the requisite management time, or staff who are committed to the overall organisational vision and values. But it may also be more problematic than this. It may confuse current strategy, warp lines of communication and accountability, contaminate existing structures. My experience has been that once this corruption has occurred, and become ingrained, it is extremely difficult for the NGO to right itself, and often difficult for it to recognise the source of the corruption. And even once it has been recognised, it can take years for the NGO to extract itself from the mistaken commitment, or incorporate it into coherent strategy.
NGOs can only work creatively with these tensions if they do not deny or avoid them. Time and resource allocation, quality of work and human resource development all become additional factors to consider when making strategic decisions. Indeed, they all form part of strategic management. It is important to recognise that the management of staff who are engaged in the facilitation of the development processes of others is very different from the management of staff whose task it is to produce a product. Very different factors come into play, making of management a far more complex and intricate discipline.
Further, people performing different strategic functions inside an NGO often gain very different levels of influence, thus complexifying organisational dynamics. And so on.
It is not that one strategy is more important or relevant than another, or that either one is irrelevant without the other; relevance and importance are a function of context and organisational constraint. Rather, the problem lies in not differentiating, which is the same as saying not strategising adequately.
The marginal nature of much NGO activity is not due primarily to size, or the fact that the "value-driven sector" does not carry as much weight as that of government, capital, or the established institutional players. We marginalise ourselves through the lack of strategic forethought. It is the old story of David and Goliath, an archetypal story which has been replayed in different forms through the ages. We could be the mosquito keeping social institutions awake at night; we could be Hannibal doing the impossible and crossing the Alps with his elephants. We could be the thorn which crippled the lion, or the mouse which pulled it out. We can be what we want to be, and do the impossible, so long as we understand the terrain, identify our particular strengths and points of entry, and strategise accordingly. The tragedy is that, instead of becoming what we want to be, we remain what we are; confused, incoherent, falling so short of our real potential.
Instead of wishing to be what we are not - mainstream institutional players, large conglomerates, policy makers and advisors to the state - let us celebrate and capitalize on what we should be. Flexible, innovative, able to manoeuvre, able to go where others cannot. Friends of the people, champions of value and consciousness, proponents of change. Repositories of civil values; fighters for a more civil society. And let us accept that the struggle is not about to end; power has always corrupted and probably still will for the foreseeable future. Development work means swimming upstream. Let us, then, be as the salmon, able to conquer gravity and confound rationality by making its way up waterfalls inside the invisible suction force created by the downward rush of water. Strategy implies using a given and turning it around, rather than opposing force with force.
I have an image of a struggle which went on for years, in what was then South West Africa, during the 1800s. The Nama, a desert people, were fighting the German invaders. The Germans were many, the Nama pitifully few. The Germans were trained for war, professional soldiers with vast experience of battle. The Nama were, well, simply a desert people. But the Germans could not rid themselves of their rigidity, their belief in their own power, their previous experience of war. They fought as if still in Europe, unable to adapt to the new environment. The Nama were at home in the desert terrain, unencumbered, highly manoeuvrable, and fighting for what was theirs by right. And they kept the Germans bogged down by their own weight; they turned every advantage which the Germans had into a disadvantage. A few desert warriors against the pride of status quo power. Strategic thinking versus numbers and might.
Civil society is our terrain; it is the home of NGOs and CBOs. The values of civil society are ours by right, for we are the ones who are defending and propagating them. Others have other interests and other functions; these are ours. Let us respect ourselves as social guerillas, live according to our values, and do the one thing which enables the small to triumph. Strategise. A little strategy can go a long way.
6.3 BRIEF NOTE ON THE PROCESS OF STRATEGIC THINKING
Strategic thinking involves thinking in two distinct ways, ways that may almost be said to be in contradiction. The one way can be termed analytic, the other conceptual.Analytic thinking has to do with understanding the given; conceptual thinking with imagining (conceiving) the future.
The discussion of strategy as it has been presented in the foregoing pages is, in large measure, an analytical discussion. It implies a rational and logical dissection both of the terrain in which we operate and of the organisational realities which permeate our particular NGO. Analysis implies breaking the whole down into its constituent parts, understanding the parts and how they interact and affect one another, and building a logical argument for point of entry and intervention. The particular method we use for breaking the whole
down into parts will differ from person to person, and possibly lead to different conclusions.
But the actual decision about which strategy to choose is accomplished through conceptual rather than analytic thinking. Strategy formulation implies choice, not simply dissection. It implies, given a particular set of circumstances and our analysis of them, going beyond the given to imagining how a particular intervention might affect those circumstances. It implies a leap of faith, for in truth we cannot know how an intervention will affect circumstances until we have tried it. Sure, there is often other's experience to go on, but no two set of circumstances is exactly alike, and no two set of practitioners is exactly alike. Besides, in the development sector we are continually at the cutting edge of social transformation; we're breaking new ground, and there is precious little successful track record to go on.
Conceptual thinking is holistic thinking, visioning. It is essentially a creative act, an imagining, the building of a whole. Analytical thinking is essentially a logical activity, an understanding, a breaking down into constituent parts. Strategy formulation is the employment of both forms of thinking in a continuous weave of alternating form. An ebb and flow, as it were. The leap of faith without background analysis is nothing more than guesswork; while background analysis without the creative jump is to be trapped by circumstance.
These two modes of thinking are very different, calling on different faculties. Leadership should be able to employ both; certainly the NGO should ensure that both modes are available and utilised.
REFERENCES
- Narsoo, M. "Civil Society: A Contested Terrain". Work in Progress Number 76 July/August 1984
- Matiwana, M. Walters, S. 1986 "The Struggle for Democracy: A Study of Community Organisations in Greater Cape Town from the 1960s to 1985." Bellville, Cape: University of the Western Cape.
- Fowler, Alan. 1992. "Institutional Development and NGOs in Africa." Oxford: Intrac. 1992
- Uphoff, N. 1986 "Local Institutional Development: An Analytical Sourcebook with Cases." West Hartford: Kumarian.
About the Community Development Resource Association (CDRA)
The Community Development Resource Association (CDRA) was established in 1987 as a non-profit, non-governmental organisation (NGO) to build the capacity of organisations and individuals engaged in development and social transformation. We are based in Cape Town, South Africa and work mostly in Southern and East Africa.
Email: vernon@cdra.org.za Webpage: http://www.cdra.org.za
P.O. Box 221, Woodstock, 7915, South Africa
Telephone: -27 -21 462 3902
Fax: -27 -21 462 3918
